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The Impacts of the Doha Round. What’s in it for Spain?1 
 
1. Introduction 
 Prior to the Uruguay Round (UR), agricultural trade had been largely exempt 
from the trade laws applicable to other sectors. For example, export subsidies employed 
prolifically by the European Union (EU) faced no disciplines, whilst the ubiquity of 
non-tariff barriers had, hitherto, been untouched. Furthermore, whilst manufacturing 
tariffs declined from highs of 30% to 5% in the three decades leading up to 1985, 
agricultural support prices, whilst declining in real terms, appreciated relative to world 
prices leading to raised levels of protection. 
 With the power of hindsight, the UR came up short in its attempts to radically 
liberalise agricultural trade, however, the agreement can be earmarked as a success in 
that it set up a firm platform for future trade rounds. For example, as a forum of debate, 
the three pillar framework (i.e., market access, export subsidies, domestic support) 
greatly improved the degree of transparency through both ‘tariffication’ and the 
introduction of the Amber, Blue and Green box measures. Moreover, the dispute 
settlement procedure has been used effectively to bring many countries’ policies into 
compliance with new disciplines. Notwithstanding, in the wake of the UR a number of 
unresolved issues persisted.   
 Firstly, average tariff rates in agricultural trade remained some way above non-
agricultural tariffs. This is because ‘tariffication’ permitted WTO members significant 
latitude in establishing tariff-equivalents,2 whilst allowing average tariff reductions to 
apply across all agricultural products. Secondly, the administration of Tariff Rate 
Quotas (TRQs) gave countries considerable flexibility in allocating their market access 
quantities at the in-quota tariff. Accordingly, TRQs lock in preferential access to 
traditional trading partners thereby limiting access by other WTO member countries. 
Expanding TRQ levels or reducing high over-quota tariffs would further open markets 
and new rules could reduce or eliminate unfair practices associated with administering 
TRQs.  
 Thirdly, though outlawed in principle, non-tariff barriers remain through the 
TRQ schemes and through, inter alia, technical barriers (e.g., labelling, size, quality), 
                                               
1 The author would like to thank the Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), 
Government of the UK, for sponsoring this research.  
2 Subsequently known as ‘dirty tariffication’. 
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health and safety requirements, sanitary and phytosanitary standards and red tape. 
Fourthly, the rules regarding the use of export credit system favoured by the USA and 
other forms of marketing assistance for exports remained unresolved. Finally, 
commitments on domestic support only applied to aggregate support categories rather 
than individual commodities, thus allowing high support to continue for more sensitive 
products. In addition, member countries have strategically employed exemptions on the 
‘blue box’ (Peace Clause) and ‘green box’ due to the lack of clarity on what exactly 
constitutes minimally trade distorting trade programmes. 
 
2. The Harbinson Proposals and the August 2004 Framework  
 Following the submission of proposals by WTO member countries in February 
2003, the Chairman of the Agriculture Negotiating Committee (Stuart Harbinson) 
produced his Negotiations on Agriculture: First Draft of Modalities for the Further 
Commitments (WTO, 2003), subsequently revised in March 2003 (WTO, 2003), which 
aimed to bridge the gaps in the negotiation positions of various countries. The 
‘Harbinson Proposal’ was not the result of negotiations and as such countries were 
under no obligation to accept it. Indeed, Japan and several other countries rejected this 
document as a basis for negotiations. However, the document carried considerable 
weight owing to the lack of alternatives; and reflected a mix of negotiating countries’ 
various positions.   
 In market access, it was proposed that tariffs, except in-quota tariffs, shall be 
reduced by a simple average for all agricultural products subject to a minimum 
reduction per tariff line.  The base for the reductions shall be the final ‘bound’ rather 
than ‘applied’ tariffs.  The tariff reductions shall be implemented in equal annual 
instalments over a period of five years for developed countries, applying the formula in 
Table 1. 
 As can be seen in the table, the lower the initial tariff, the lower the tariff cut. 
This was seen as advantageous over the UR market access agreement in that it reduces 
tariff peaks, whilst ‘trade-offs’ between cutting higher and lower tariffs to meet the 
average tariff cut can only be made in the respective groups of tariffs.  It should be 
noted that the EU proposed the same UR formula for the current Round; that is, it did 
not accept this proposal from Harbinson. The Harbinson Paper also proposes increased 
market access through increases in tariff rate quotas to 10 % of present domestic 
consumption. 
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Existing tariff level simple average 
reduction rate (%) 
minimum cut per 
tariff line (%) 
Tariffs greater than 90 per cent ad valorem 60 45 
Tariffs lower than or equal to 90 per cent 
ad valorem and greater than 15 per cent ad 
valorem 
 
50 
 
35 
Tariffs lower than or equal to 15 per cent 
ad valorem 
 
40 
 
25 
Table 1 – Illustration of the Harbinson Formula for tariff reductions 
Adapted from: WTO (2003) 
 
Export subsidy reduction commitments will use the final bound levels from 2000 
as their starting point. Harbinson proposed that export subsidies will be eliminated 
entirely over a nine year time frame with a heavy ‘front-loading’ emphasis on the first 
five years. Finally, under domestic support, the proposals suggested a 60 per cent 
reduction in Amber Box commitments, whilst minimum spending (de minimis) is to be 
reduced from 5 per cent of the value of agricultural production to 2.5 per cent over 5 
years. Blue box spending is to be bound at 1999-2001 (average) levels and reduced by 
50 per cent over 5 years, or included in the amber box and effectively cut by 60 per 
cent. Green box exemptions shall be maintained with a general tightening of certain 
criteria for program inclusion. However, one green box category, ‘environmental 
programs’, is expanded to permit payments for animal welfare programs (as a legitimate 
non-trade concern). 
Given the large discrepancies between the negotiating positions of the member 
countries to the Harbinson proposals, the decisions reached in the August 2004 
Framework (WTO, 2004) could be criticised for being somewhat nebulous.  Proponents 
of the August 2004 Framework, however, point out that it provides firm commitments 
across all three agricultural pillars and that, while it does not prescribe the exact nature 
of the cuts, it provides a platform for the next stage of negotiations (due to take place in 
Hong Kong in December 2005). Indeed, further issues arose from the August 
Framework pertaining to market access for ‘sensitive products’ and the extension of 
export subsidisation to include export credit programmes, state trading enterprises and 
food aid that does not conform with various disciplines, although special considerations 
would be given to poorer trading nations.  
In terms of domestic support, the consensus was to allow gentler cuts over 
longer periods for the developing countries, whilst a ‘tiered formula’ is under 
consideration such that higher levels of support (those in higher ‘tiers’) will have 
  4
steeper cuts. Moreover, the de minimis level of support is to be discussed whilst 
product-specific Amber support will be capped in order to avoid shifting support 
between different products. Since the tiered formula applies to the total of support on all 
products, the text also says that the result will be cuts in support specified for some 
products. Blue Box support, previously protected by the ‘Peace Clause’ is facing a cap 
of no more than 5% of agricultural production, although flexibility will be allowed for 
countries (i.e., EU) whose Blue Box supports are an exceptionally large proportion of 
their trade distorting subsidies. Moreover, the definition of the Blue Box will be re-
examined to ensure that this class of payments (linked to fixed production limits – 
acreages, yields, livestock head or historical production limits) are genuinely less trade-
distorting than Amber Box measures.  
 
3. Review of Empirical Studies of the Doha Round 
The recent trade policy literature examining the impacts of the Doha Round has 
been dominated by the usage of computable general equilibrium (CGE) analysis. 
Indeed, the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database has become something of a 
standard workhorse in multilateral trade reform analysis. In Table 2, a number of CGE 
studies have been employed to analyse the costs of the Doha Proposals. An important 
point to note is that even given the usage of a single data source, the outcomes for 
global real income changes (i.e., equivalent variation) differ quite substantially between 
studies.  
One explanation for these differences is the variation in model assumptions 
employed which have the effect of boosting the welfare estimates. For example in 
dynamic model variants, capital accumulation over successive time periods can greatly 
increase household incomes compared with the comparative static model counterparts.3 
The assumption of imperfect competition also raises the welfare estimates through 
introduction of additional non-standard market distortions (i.e., price mark-ups, 
increasing returns to scale) which via liberalisation release additional welfare gains in 
comparison with the standard model estimates. Additionally, further welfare 
magnification effects in developing countries occur through the imposition of trade-
productivity linkages as productivity improvements in developing countries are greatly 
enhanced through assumptions of technology transfer. The results of these studies, 
                                               
3 In CGE models, it is normally assumed that the household(s) own the factors of production. 
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whilst more striking are based on tentative estimates which introduces some degree of 
uncertainty as to their validity.4 
 
Study Model Liberalisation Scenario Notes Welfare (US$bill) 
    Ag Other Total 
ABARE 2000 GTEM 
Dynamic 
GTAP Data 
50% liberalisation, all sectors, 
all policies, all regions 
Base scenario 53 41 94 
   base + productivity 
gains 
  123 
Anderson et 
al. (2000) 
GTAP 100% Liberalisation, all 
sectors, all tariffs all regions 
 165 90 254 
Beghin et al. 
(2001) 
LINKAGE 
Dynamic 
GTAP data 
100% Liberalisation, 
agriculture only, all policies 
high income countries only 
Dynamic model 82   
USDA (2001) CGE Dynamic 100% Liberalisation, 
agriculture only, all policies 
Standard version 31 na na 
OECD (2003) GTAP 100% Liberalisation, all 
sectors, all tariffs  
 
 
34 63 97 
Francois et al. 
(2003) 
GTAP 100% Liberalisation, all 
sectors, all tariffs all regions 
Increasing returns 
to scale   
109 257 366 
  50% Liberalisation, all 
sectors, all tariffs all regions 
Standard version 28 104 132 
Brockmeier et 
al. (2003) 
GTAP Harbinson Proposals  
(includes CAP modelling) 
Standard version na na na 
World Bank 
2004 
LINKAGE 
Dynamic 
GTAP v6 data 
100% Liberalisation, all 
sectors, all policies all regions 
Standard version 193 98 291 
Beghin & Van 
Mensbrugge 
(2004) 
LINKAGE 
Dynamic 
GTAP v6 data 
100% Liberalisation, all 
sectors, all tariffs all regions 
Dynamic model 120 264 384 
Francois et al 
(2005) 
GTAP v6 50% Liberalisation, all 
sectors, all tariffs all regions 
Increasing returns 
to scale   
30 138 168 
(b) 
World Bank 
2005 
LINKAGE 
Dynamic 
GTAP v6 data 
100% Liberalisation, all 
sectors, all policies all regions 
Dynamic model   263 
(b) 
Table 2 – Previous trade liberalisation estimates 
Source: Van Tongeren (2005), Osbourne (2005) and Renwick et al. (2005) 
Notes a) includes services, b) in US$ 2001  
 
Other sources of variation stem from the benchmark year of the GTAP data. 
Version 5 employed in a number of studies is benchmarked to 1997, which implies 
greater tariff peaks than included in version 6 (2001 benchmark year) of the GTAP data. 
Thus under tariff reform scenarios, this may imply greater welfare impacts in the former 
data version.5 Moreover, version 6 is based on applied tariff rates only, whilst version 5 
                                               
4 For example, in imperfectly competitive industries, we are unsure of the concentration ratios and 
ensuing price markup effects in sectors for each region. In the dynamic model, the degree of capital 
accumulation is calibrated to baseline shocks, although the extent of dynamic accumulation itself is 
entirely determined by the parameters of the model. Finally, trade productivity growth is determined by 
an arbitrary technology transfer function which is not based on empirical robustness. 
5 Although this depends on how the remaining developed country Uruguay Round commitments to 2001 
are dealt with in version 5. 
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used both applied and bound rates (where applied rates were unavailable). This has 
implications for the treatment of the binding overhang (difference between bound and 
applied rates), such that when the scenarios reduce applied levels of tariffs, they may 
overstate the true effect on market access. Finally, a further cause of variation occurs 
from the ‘scenario design’ where the degree of reform in tariffs, export subsidies and 
amber box and the choice of reforming regions in the aggregation varies between 
studies. 
All of the studies reviewed present results for broad regional aggregates (i.e., 
EU), focusing more on the impacts of specific policy instruments (i.e, market access, 
export subsidies, Amber Box support) whilst in this study an explicit aim is to examine 
the potential welfare impacts of the Doha Round proposals in their current form on 
Spain from a ‘likely scenario’ and contrast these where appropriate with other select EU 
members and the European Union average. Accordingly, as well as incorporating a fully 
inclusive baseline scenario including long run ‘background’ trade policy shocks, we 
also explicitly model CAP support mechanisms (i.e., quotas, set-aside, EU budget 
contributions, single farm payment) to give greater depth to the asymmetric effects the 
Doha Round may have on different EU member states.6  
 
4. Modelling and Scenarios 
4.1 GTAP Data and Aggregation 
This study employs the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) CGE model 
Hertel (1997) and accompanying version 6 database (Dimaranan and McDougall, 
2005).7 Version 6 data represents a significant advance on version 5 in terms of (inter 
alia) broader regional coverage (87 regions), improved trade and demand elasticity 
estimates and perhaps most importantly, significant refinements to the tariff protection 
data.8 To examine the long run impacts of the current Doha Round proposals from the 
perspective of Spain, the Spanish economy and the ‘big three’ (Germany, the UK and 
France) are disaggregated from the rest of the EU15 region (REU15). The aggregation 
also covers the ‘new’ members of the EU (EU10) and a number of key players on world 
                                               
6 To the author’s knowledge, only the Brockmeier et al. (2003) study explicitly incorporates modelling of 
the CAP in the policy scenarios.  
7 The standard GTAP model and accompanying database have been used in numerous studies. For this 
reason, we do not provide a detailed explanation of the model framework. For further information consult 
Hertel (1997). 
8 The improvements in the collection, reconciliation and application of the tariff data sources are 
documented in chapter 16.D of Dimaranan and McDougall (2005). 
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agricultural markets (USA, Brazil, China, India, Japan). The Rest of the World (ROW) 
region captures ‘residual’ production and trade flows in our chosen model aggregation.  
 
 
I. Chosen Sectoral Aggregation (22 GTAP Sectors in bold) 
Wheat (wheat) – Soft Wheat, Durum Wheat; Other Grains (ograins) – Rye, sorghum, barley, oats, 
maize, millet, other cereals; Oilseeds (oilseeds) - Rape and mustard seed, sunflower seed, soyabeans, 
olives for oil, cotton seed, sesame seed; Other Crops (ocrops) - Plant-based fibers, flax and hemp, 
coffee, cocoa beans, tea, coconuts, spices, tobacco, table grapes, table olives, table wine, other wine 
nursery plants, flowers, ornamental plants, other final crop products; Vegetables, Fruit and Nuts 
(vegfruitnuts)– Potato, peas, cauliflower, tomato, pulses, other vegetables, nuts, olives, onions, apple, 
pears and peaches, bananas, other fruits, citrus fruits; Sugar (sugar) – Sugar cane, sugar beet; Milk 
(milk) – Dairy cows and other cows; Cattle and Sheep (catshp) – Male adult cattle for fattening, calves 
for fattening, calves, rearing, heifers, sheep and goats for fattening; Pigs and Poultry (pigspoultry) – 
Pigs for fattening, pig breeding, laying hens, poultry for fattening, other animals; Fishing (fishing) – All 
fishing activities; Other Agriculture (oagric) – Paddy rice, wool, silk-worm cocoons; Forestry 
(forestry) – Forestry; Meat processing (meatpro) – Meat products (bovine, sheep and goat); Other meat 
processing (omeatpro) – Eggs and egg products, meat products (pigs, poultry); Vegetable oils and fats 
(vegoilsfats) – Coconut oil, cottonseed oil, groundnut oils, oilseed oils, olive oil, palmkernel oils, rice 
bran oils, rape and mustard oils, soyabean oil, sunflower seed oils, animal fats; Dairy (dairy) – Butter, 
cheese, cream, whey and products, skimmed milk; Sugar processing (sugarpro) – Refined sugar, 
sweeteners; Beverages and Tobacco (bevstobac) – Cigarettes, Cigars etc., Wines and Spirits, Beer; 
Other Food Processing (ofoodpro) – Processed rice, sea food products, hides and skins, meat and blood 
meal, edible offals; Raw materials (rawmat) – Coal, oil, gas, minerals, Petroleum and coal products; 
Manufacturing (mnfcs) – Textiles; wearing apparel; leather products; wood products; paper products 
and publishing; chemical, rubber and plastic products; ferrous metals; Other metal products; motor 
vehicles and parts; transport equipment; electronic equipment; machinery and parts. 
Services (svces) – Utilities (Gas, water, electricity); construction; trade services; transport (air, sea, 
road); communications; financial services; insurance; other business services; recreation and other 
services; dwellings; public administration/defence/health, education. 
 
II. Chosen Regional Aggregation (12 Regions) 
Spain; UK, France, Germany, REU15; EU10; USA; Brazil; China; India; Japan; Rest of the World 
(ROW). 
Figure 1: Aggregation of Regions and Sectors. 
As noted at the beginning of this paper, tariff peaks in agri-food trade are 
considerably greater than in non-food sectors, whilst a key focus of the round has been 
the improvement of market access in agricultural markets to facilitate trade led growth 
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in developing countries. For these underlying reasons, the choice of sectoral aggregation 
(see Figure 1) is biased toward the agricultural and food processing sectors, whilst non-
food sectors are captured through composite sector aggregates. 
 
4.1.1 Spanish Agriculture and GTAP data 
Whilst the CAP has been reformed, it still favours larger farming units since 
payments are indirectly awarded on the basis of production levels (i.e., the amount of 
inputs used). This has resulted in considerable restructuring of farming in many EU 
partners including Spain, with many smaller farmers being left marginalised or forced to 
leave the land and the emergence of a rationalisation of the agricultural sector into fewer 
large-scale farming units.9 Indeed, on the one hand the real value of agricultural output 
in Spain between 1990 and 2003 has been steadily increasing (MAPA, 2004), 
particularly in cereals, fruit, olive oil, cattle and pork production. This is largely in 
response to the European reforms introduced during the 1990s. On the other hand, the 
industry has seen a continuing exodus of farmers where MAPA (2002a) figures suggest 
that the reduction in agricultural labour between 1990 and 2001 could be a large as 36 
per cent. 
Notwithstanding, compared with fellow EU members, the commission’s figures 
for 2002 (EC, 2002) suggest that primary agriculture in Spain is still relatively 
important accounting for 3% of national GDP compared with a corresponding EU15 
average of 2%, whilst approximately 14% of EU15 agricultural production comes from 
Spain. Equally, processed food production is also important to the Spanish economy 
accounting for 16% of total industry revenue, and 10% of EU15 output, whilst between 
1995 and 2000 food processing growth was 20% with accompanying employment 
growth of 6% (MAPA, 2002a). These figures concur with the descriptive statistics from 
the GTAP data in Table 3 which compares the Spanish economy with the big three and 
the EU averages. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
9 However, Spanish farming still remains largely fragmented relative to the EU15 average. 
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(%) France Germany Spain UK EU15 EU10 
1. Share of EU15 GDP 16.7 23.4 7.4 18.0 100.0 n.a. 
2. Share of EU25 GDP 15.9 22.4 7.0 17.2 95.6 4.4 
3. Agric. share of national GDP 2.2 1.3 3.4 0.9 1.9 3.7 
4. Food share of national GDP 5.0 4.5 6.2 5.3 5.1 9.3 
5. Agro-food share of nat. GDP (3+4) 7.2 5.8 9.6 6.2 7.0 13.0 
6. Agric. share of EU15 production 18.3 16.8 12.3 8.3 100.0 n.a. 
7. Agric. share of EU25 production 16.5 15.2 11.1 7.5 90.2 9.8 
8. Food share of EU15 production 15.6 21.3 8.5 18.8 100.0 n.a. 
9. Food share of EU25 production 14.1 19.3 7.7 17.1 90.8 9.2 
10. Agri-food share of EU15 production 16.3 20.1 9.5 16.0 100.0 n.a. 
11. Agri-food share of EU25 production 14.8 18.2 8.6 14.5 90.6 9.4 
Table 3: Comparative descriptive statistics  
for agriculture and food – GTAP v6 database 
Source: Dimaranan and McDougall (2005) 
 
Examining the GTAP 2001 domestic support data for Spain reveals much about 
the sectoral allocation of the CAP payments. Spain is the biggest recipient in the EU of 
production related (i.e., Amber Box) payments10 (€1.365bn in 2001) largely through 
payments on production of olive oil (€0.999bn.), bananas (€0.167bn.) and tobacco 
(€0.116bn) in the ‘oilseeds’, ‘ocrops’ and ‘vegfruitnuts’ aggregate sectors respectively. 
Spain is also the fourth largest recipient of decoupled payments (area and set-aside 
payments) to the cereals sector (after France, Germany and Italy) and the third largest 
recipient of CAP funding in the cattle and sheep sector (cow, ewe and goat premia, 
extensification premia) after France and the UK. Of the €45bn. spent on agricultural 
support, Spain received €5.872bn., third after France (€9.978bn.) and Germany 
(€6.908bn.). Indeed, given the relative size of the Spanish economy, this explains why 
Spain is consistently the largest net beneficiary from the CAP budget in nominal terms 
(whilst the largest gainers as a percentage of GDP are Portugal and Greece). 
Interestingly, the allocation of support in Spain reveals that (in order) the five regions of 
Andalucía, Castilla-León, Castilla-La Mancha, Extremadura and Aragón received 
approximately 70% of CAP support in 2000 (MAPA, 2002b). 
                                               
10 Represented in the GTAP database as output subsidies. 
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Figure 2: Average ad valorem tariff rates on Spanish imports by sector. 
Source: Dimaranan and McDougall (2005) 
  
In terms of trade protection, the largest export subsidies across the EU regions 
appear in the aggregate ‘meatpro’, ‘sugarpro’, ‘ograins’ and ‘dairy’ sectors.11 Finally, 
aggregate ad valorem tariff protection in Spain is skewed heavily toward the agro-food 
sectors, whilst tariff peaks appear for ‘meatpro’ (76%), ‘sugarpro’ (35.8%), ‘dairy’ 
(30.9%), ‘ograins’ (24.7%), ‘omeatpro’ (22.1%), ‘vegoilsfats’ (20.6%) and ‘oagric’ 
(19.8%) (see Figure 2). 
 
4.2 GTAP Model 
In the standard comparative static GTAP framework, the model framework is 
based on market clearing equations (e.g., supply equals demands) for each sector and 
accounting conventions (e.g., income equals expenditure equals output, zero long run 
profits). Weak separability assumptions are employed to partition consumer and 
producer decisions into ‘nests’ (multi-stage budgeting) based on conventional neo-
classical behaviour (utility maximisation, cost minimisation), whilst regional utility is 
aggregated over private demands (non-homothetic), public demands and savings 
(investment demand). Production is characterised employing a perfectly competitive, 
constant-returns-to-scale technology and bilateral imports are differentiated by region of 
origin using the Armington (1969) specification. The model incorporates five factors of 
production, where skilled/unskilled labour and capital are perfectly mobile, whilst land 
                                               
11 See figure 1 for a detailed composition of the aggregate sectors. 
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and natural resources are both sector specific with the former moving ‘sluggishly’ 
between productive sectors. Given the long run nature of the experiments (see next 
section), in all factors markets, full employment is assumed. Finally, investment 
behaviour is characterised by a fictitious ‘global bank’ which collects investment funds 
(savings) from each region and disburses them across regions according to a rate of 
return or a fixed investment share mechanism.  
 
5. Model Extensions, Scenario Design and Results 
In this study we develop a plausible long run baseline scenario projected from 
the benchmark year (2001) to 2020 against which we compare our Doha Round 
Scenarios. The composition of the baseline scenario is presented in Figure 3, whilst 
details of the modelling of the baseline are presented in Appendix 1. In comparison with 
the baseline we examine 3 alternative scenarios. In Scenario 2, we include the baseline 
shocks and in addition examine a ‘likely’ outcome based on the Harbinson proposal and 
the subsequent August 2004 framework. 
 
 
Baseline Scenario Assumptions: 2001 - 2020 
1. Projections 
Productivity, population change, growth, skilled and unskilled labour. 
2. Uruguay Round Commitments 
Enforce developed country commitments 
Complete developing country commitments 
3. EU Enlargement 
Remove all border protection (i.e., export subsidies, import tariffs) between existing and ‘new’ member 
states. 
Impose common external tariff for all new EU members of the customs union. 
4. Agenda 2000 (A2000) commitments and the Mid Term Review (MTR) 
Modelling of CAP mechanisms (CAP budget, modulation, quotas, set-aside, intervention prices) 
Reduction of intervention prices under A2000 and MTR reforms 
Imposition of set-aside for the ‘new’ EU member states 
Milk quota adjustments under the MTR. Sugar quota unchanged. 
Full implementation of the single farm payment (i.e., total decoupling) under the MTR 
Additional compensation for milk and proposed sugar reforms.  
Full decoupling of direct support to tobacco and partial decoupling of direct support for olive oil. 
CAP budget including the implementation of Modulation funding and the UK Rebate mechanism (which 
is abolished by 2020). 
5. Chinese Accession 
Unilateral tariff reductions by China 
6. Everything But Arms (EBA) deal 
Developing country trade weighted tariff rate eliminations by the EU25 on imports from the ROW. 
Figure 3: Assumptions shaping the baseline scenario 
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Thus, ‘average’ ad valorem tariffs in scenario 2 are reduced in accordance with 
Table 4.12 In the case of the tariff rate quota routes, we reduce the over-quota tariff rates 
by the same percentages, whilst increasing the quota to 10% of present consumption. 
Moreover, it is assumed that the non-agricultural sectors also have the same average 
tariff rates reductions as suggested by Harbinson for the agricultural sectors. 
Furthermore, we follow the current Doha proposals by abolishing all export subsidies, 
whilst reducing Amber Box (output subsidies) support by 60 (40) percent for developed 
(developing) countries. In the EU, since the SFP effectively transfers payments out of 
the Blue Box (as argued by the EU) no expenditure limits are implemented. Scenarios 1 
and 3 are identical to scenario 2, except that we introduce a sensitivity analysis of the 
degree of market access (see Table 4).  
 
 
Developed Countries Average reduction rate 
Existing tariff level Low (S1) Harbinson’s 
proposal (S2) 
High (S3) 
Greater than 90 per cent 40% 60% 80% 
Between 15 and 90 per cent 30% 50% 70% 
Lower than or equal to 15 per cent 20% 40% 60% 
Developing Countries  
Existing tariff level Low (S1) Harbinson’s 
proposal (S2) 
High (S3) 
Greater than 120 per cent 20% 40% 60% 
Between 60 and 120 per cent 15% 35% 55% 
Between 20 and 60 per cent 10% 30% 50% 
Lower than or equal to 20 per cent 5% 25% 45% 
Table 4 – Illustration of the Harbinson Formula for tariff reductions 
Adapted from: WTO (2003) 
 
5.1 Results for Spain - Trade Balances, Output and Market Prices.. 
In Table 5, we presented the changes in Spanish market prices, trade balances 
and output from implementation of the Round in comparison with the baseline 
scenario.13 The market price estimates are aggregated over domestic and import 
purchases. Since import tariff rate reductions reduce the ‘insulation’ between artificially 
high internal market prices and world prices, market prices fall in most sectors 
compared with the baseline. However, what is surprising is that the magnitude of the 
long run price falls appears to be fairly small. The main exceptions are ‘dairy’, 
                                               
12 Given broader sector aggregates in the GTAP, we do not attempt implement minimum tariff line 
reductions. 
13 The value estimates in the results are in 2001 prices and in millions of euro. 
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‘sugarpro’ and ‘vegoilsfats’ sectors14 which have relatively significant trade activity 
(compared with domestic sales). In the upstream ‘sugar’ and ‘milk’ sectors, market 
price falls are a function of declining quota rent values (compared with the baseline) due 
to reduced demand from downstream ‘dairy’ and ‘sugarpro’ sectors. Successively 
higher foreign access to Spanish ‘dairy’ and ‘sugarpro’ markets leads to a greater drop 
off in intermediate demand for upstream sugar and raw milk leading greater falls in 
rents and market prices. In the ‘oilseeds’ and ‘fishing’ sectors, market prices are 
dominated by the 60% reduction in production related (Amber box) support, 
represented in GTAP as a production subsidy.15 
Increased multilateral market access increases Spanish imports resulting in 
deteriorating sectoral trade balances (e.g., ‘dairy’, ‘meatpro’, ‘oagric’, ‘ofoodpro’, 
‘ograins’, ‘sugarpro’, ‘vegfruitsnuts’, ‘vegoilsfats’) and declining domestic production. 
The trade balance (-€34.8m to -€127.2m) and output contractions are particularly 
worrying in the case of the ‘vegfruitnuts’16 sector which houses many of Spain’s 
‘sensitive’ Mediterranean crops. More encouragingly, ‘wheat’ and ‘ocrops’ sectors are 
comparatively competitive (low/zero benchmark tariff rates), resulting in trade balance 
(€4.6m to €11.5m; €30.7m to €51.1m) and output (-0.04% to 2.70%; 0.97% to 1.93%) 
improvements above the baseline.17  
Furthermore, ‘pigspoultry’ and the ‘omeatpro’ sector (which encompasses pork 
and poultry meat production), undergo relative improvements in the trade balance and 
export led sectoral output. This result is largely attributed to Spain’s relatively strong 
export trade links with the ROW region whilst both regions have similar tariff 
protection. ‘Sugar’ and ‘milk’ production levels are under quota, where the simulations 
suggest that the Spanish quota in both sectors remain binding.18 
                                               
14 Meatpro market price falls are relatively small despite having heavy import protection in Spain. This is 
because the level of import trade in the Spanish data is relatively small compared with domestic 
production. 
15 In the baseline, 60% of olive production subsidies are transferred to the single farm payment scheme 
under the CAP reforms for Mediterranean products, leaving 40% in the Amber Box. Under the Common 
Fisheries Policy, fishing activities receive considerable production related support. Currently Spain 
receives approximately 45% of the EU’s Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG) funds. 
Further discussion of this point appears in the conclusions. 
16 In value terms the ‘vegfruitsnuts’ sector is the largest primary agricultural sector in Spain followed by 
‘pigspoultry’ and ‘fishing’. 
17 In the case of the oilseeds sector, the 60% removal of Amber box support reduces output relative to the 
baseline. 
18 Examining the GTAP data, sugar cane/beet and processed sugar production are not amongst the more 
important agricultural activities in Spain. In the GTAP model, raw milk is a non-tradable product in 
GTAP, where trade occurs through the downstream ‘dairy’ sector.  
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Finally with increased market access, Spain’s aggregate trade balance improves 
between €402.5m to €722.9m compared with the baseline through the reallocation of 
resources from agro-food to manufacturing and services activities. This is reflected in 
the increased levels of production activity in both composite manufacturing (0.33% to 
0.42%) and services (0.010% to 0.014%) and their improved trade balances (€469.4m to 
€777.0m; €171.7m to €257.4m) compared to the baseline scenario.  
 
 Trade Balance (€m 2001) Market Prices (%) Output (%) 
 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 
wheat 4.6 7.7 11.5 - - - - 1.16 2.70 
ograins - - -1.5 - - - -1.11 - - 
oilseeds -73.6 -64.3 -54.7 1.95 1.84 1.74 -4.41 -4.69 -5.00 
ocrops 30.7 40.6 51.7 - - - + 1.40 1.93 
vegfruitnuts -34.8 -81.1 -127.2 - - - - -1.47 -2.22 
sugar + + + -3.35 -4.69 -5.81 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 
milk nt nt nt -2.12 -2.16 -2.26 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 
catshp 1.0 + 1.0 - - - -1.07 -1.10 -1.26 
pigspoultry + 2.5 4.4 - - - - + + 
fishing -16.9 -16.7 -16.5 2.82 2.81 2.81 -1.68 -1.68 -1.69 
oagric 22.0 19.3 12.0 + + - 3.65 2.82 1.30 
forestry - - - + + + + + + 
meatpro -20.8 -21.6 -22.3 - - - -1.03 -1.05 -1.21 
omeatpro -21.6 6.5 37.8 - - - - + + 
vegoilsfats -85.2 -131.4 -179.8 -2.07 -2.11 -2.15 -3.80 -5.37 -6.99 
dairy -8.7 -9.0 -9.5 -2.14 -2.96 -3.11 - - - 
sugarpro + + - -4.34 -5.93 -7.39 - - - 
bevstobac 5.2 7.0 9.0 - - - + + + 
ofoodpro -54.0 -64.1 -74.7 - - - - - -1.03 
rawmat 12.5 29.8 48.0 + + + + 1.22 1.85 
Mnfcs 469.4 616.7 777.0 - - - + + + 
Svces 171.7 217.0 257.4 - - - + + + 
TOTAL 402.5 558.9 722.9       
Table 5: Spanish Trade Balances, Market Prices and Output 
+/- indicates less than + or -1%; nt = non-tradable; * quota constrained output 
 
5.2 Aggregate welfare results 
Table 6 shows the aggregate equivalent variation (real income) impacts of S1-S3 
in Spain relative to the three largest EU countries (i.e., France, Germany, UK), the 
EU15 and the EU25.19 The values are presented in millions of euros in 2001 values. The 
decomposition of regional equivalent variation is divided into terms of trade effects, 
allocative efficiency effects, CAP budget effects and ‘other’.20 
 
 
                                               
19 Whilst there are numerous other results for other countries in the aggregation, in this paper we choose 
to maintain a European focus to examine the asymmetric effects of the round on European partners. 
20 ‘Other’ consists of income changes from the exogenous baseline assumptions (i.e., endowment 
increases, technological improvements, population changes). 
  15
S1 (Low market access) Spain France Germany UK EU15 EU25 
Real Income (€m) -156.6 410.0 1078.5 665.9 2486.3 2633.2 
Real income (%) -0.03 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.04 
Of which:        
Terms of Trade (€m) -19.8 276.9 586.8 274.2 1579.0 1675.5 
Allocative efficieny (€m) 149.4 120.3 248.3 118.0 1258.6 1223.7 
CAP budget (€m) -263.0 50.7 298.8 283.8 -72.2 0.0 
Other (€m) -23.2 -37.9 -55.5 -10.1 -279.2 -266.0 
S2 (Harbinson) Spain France Germany UK EU15 EU25 
Real Income (€m) -32.2 407.9 1092.2 681.2 3009.4 3110.6 
Real income (%) -0.01 0.04 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.05 
Of which:        
Terms of Trade (€m) 93.9 395.0 698.3 265.7 2310.6 2399.2 
Allocative efficieny (€m) 135.0 13.2 170.2 128.6 1008.2 936.7 
CAP budget (€m) -267.3 48.3 302.0 291.0 -71.1 0.0 
Other (€m) 6.1 -48.6 -78.2 -4.1 -238.4 -225.4 
S3 (High market access) Spain France Germany UK EU15 EU25 
Real Income (€m) 102.3 374.4 1131.4 690.4 3437.5 3493.2 
Real income (%) 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.05 
Of which:        
Terms of Trade (€m) 215.5 512.5 810.7 256.9 3062.4 3147.3 
Allocative efficieny (€m) 121.7 -121.6 113.9 136.9 652.2 532.8 
CAP budget (€m) -270.9 43.5 307.8 298.3 -77.4 0.0 
Other (€m) 35.9 -59.9 -101.0 -1.7 -199.6 -186.8 
Table 6: Aggregate EU welfare effects. 
 
Perhaps the most important result is that from a European perspective, the 
current Doha proposals have a very minor impact on real income gains. Even under the 
high market access scenario, estimates suggest EU15 (EU25) average gains of around 
0.04% of real income. Indeed, at the global level, the EV gains are estimated at €12.8bn 
(S1), €23.4bn (S2) and €32.5bn (S3) respectively. Compared with the range of estimates 
from section 3, this would appear at the lower end of the estimates in the literature. 
There are a number of reasons to explain this result. Firstly, we are using GTAP version 
6 data benchmarked to 2001 (rather than 1997 in GTAP version 5) resulting in lower 
tariff and subsidy rates. Secondly, we have not incorporated additional modelling 
features such as imperfect competition which can magnify welfare estimates 
considerably through ‘pro-competitive’ effects (Hertel 1994) or ‘love of variety’ effects 
(Spence, 1976; Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977) on the consumer side. Due to the data 
difficulties of accurately calibrating concentration ratios and ‘love of variety’ scaling 
effects for a broad number of sectors and regions, the results themselves whilst larger 
are also more subjective. Thirdly, we have completely isolated the impacts of the Doha 
proposals, whilst all remaining long run trade policy changes (i.e. Chinese accession, 
Everything but Arms, CAP reforms) are all characterised in the baseline scenario. 
Finally, given the large country assumption of the EU on agricultural markets, the 
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explicit representation of EU agricultural market rigidities (quotas, set-aside, single 
farm payment) restricts the responsiveness of resource shifts from the agricultural 
sectors to non- agricultural uses from to policy change. Accordingly, the allocative 
effects reported in Table 6 are likely to be muted. 
Examining the results from the Spanish perspective reveals that under S1 and 
S2, Spain loses real income (-€156.6m and -€32.2m respectively) compared with small 
estimated gains for France, Germany and the UK. Under ‘high’ market access (S3), 
terms of trade effects improve sufficiently to yield a gain of €102.3m to Spain, although 
this is tempered by continued net losses on the CAP budget, which are not apparent in 
France, Germany and the UK.  
 
 S1 S2 S3 
CAP Budget -263.0 -267.3 -270.9 
CAP expenditure -475.2 -475.1 -475.2 
Of which:    
                     Direct Payments      0.0     0.0      0.0 
                     Export Subsidies   -94.2   -94.2    -94.2 
                     Amber Support -378.8 -378.6 -378.4 
                     Intermediate input subsidies     -2.1     -2.3     -2.6 
Tariff Revenues     -5.6   -10.3   -16.0 
GDP contribution -206.4 -197.3 -188.1 
Table 7: Changes (€millions) in Spanish net CAP contributions  
compared with the baseline. 
 
A breakdown of the CAP budget for Spain is shown in Table 7,21 which reveals 
that Spain’s CAP receipts fall by €475 million compared with the baseline. Further 
decomposition of this result reveals that Spain’s principle losses partly come from the 
removal of export subsidies (-€94.2m) and most importantly Amber box support 
reductions (-€379m). Unlike France, Germany and the UK, Spain receives 45% of the 
production related support from the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) and still has 
production aids on ‘sensitive’ products (i.e., olive production, bananas etc.). 
Furthermore, Spain contributes a smaller share to the own resources of the CAP budget 
rendering it a net beneficiary. Thus, contractions in the EU25 CAP budget from Amber 
box and export subsidy reductions benefit net contributors (i.e., Germany, the UK and 
to a lesser extent France) through compensating falls in GDP contributions, whilst 
Spain’s GDP falls do not offset the losses in support. 
 
                                               
21 Note that decoupled payments do not change as the single farm payment under the mid term review of 
the CAP is already incorporated in the baseline already. 
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6. Conclusions 
Whilst there is a growing literature examining the impacts of the current Doha 
Proposals for a number of broad regional aggregates, in this paper we attempt to 
examine the proposals more closely from the EU perspective, more specifically for the 
Spanish economy. The distinguishing features of this paper are (i) that we employ an all 
inclusive baseline scenario including the key long term global developments including 
the latest CAP reforms (mid term review, Mediterranean products reforms), thereby 
allowing us to isolate and evaluate the long term costs of the Doha proposals and (ii) we 
employing explicit CAP modelling (i.e., set-aside, CAP budget, sugar and milk quotas, 
single farm payment etc.), which provides greater credibility in assessing the long run 
asymmetric budgetary and welfare impacts from the proposals on EU member states.22  
 The sectoral results for Spain suggest that there is substitution in arable activities 
from ‘vegetable, fruits and nuts’, ‘oilseeds’ (including olive production) and ‘other 
grains’ into ‘wheat’, ‘other crops’ and ‘oagric’ production. Livestock production 
appears to focus slightly more on white meat production, with small concurrent declines 
in red meat output. In broader terms, there is an expected shift from agro-food activities 
into manufacturing and services production. The analysis suggests that the regional real 
income effects are likely to be small, where in the case of Spain the economy will make 
a slight loss from the Doha proposals in the ‘low’ (S1) and ‘Harbinson’ (S2) market 
access scenarios, whilst terms of trade improvements in the ‘high’ (S3) access scenario 
result in a welfare gain of €102.3m (0.02% GDP). In the case of France, Germany and 
the UK, welfare is set to rise marginally in each region, largely due to favourable 
changes in the CAP budget (which do not occur in Spain). As noted above, this is in 
part due to Spain’s relatively smaller GDP contribution and considerably larger amber 
support payment, particularly in the fishing sector. 
Presently, the WTO does not have specific provisions dealing with fisheries 
subsidies. Instead fishing subsidies are disciplined by the general subsidies rules found 
in the current WTO Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) agreement. Thus, at 
the time of writing, there are no special safeguards linking fisheries support with 
                                               
22 It should, however, be noted that since the model simulations take a long run view, they have nothing 
to say about the short to medium term frictional costs of resource reallocation, particularly labour (i.e., 
unemployment). 
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environmental considerations relating to depleted fish stocks and pollution.23 Whilst 
there is much debate on how best to reform fishing subsidies in the context of 
international trade law, the outcome in the current round is far from certain. 
Accordingly, in this paper we maintained the status quo assumption of treating fishing 
activities equal to other sectors (i.e., Amber box reductions). The results from this paper 
appear to indicate that not only will the outcome of this debate have clear ramifications 
for Spain’s fishing industry, but also for Spain’s net contributions to Brussels and 
ultimately regional welfare.  
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8. Appendix. 
1. Projections: 
To model the structure of the world economy over the implementation period of the Doha Round and 
beyond, projections data are implemented for each of the regions. Annual average percentage changes 
over the long run period are collected from other CGE studies (Frandsen and Jensen, 2001; Jensen and 
Frandsen, 2003) other data sources (World Bank) and the author’s own calculations to reflect increases in 
skilled and unskilled labour endowments; population; total factor productivity (TFP) in agriculture, 
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industry and services sectors; and real GDP growth. Capital endowment growth is calibrated to changes 
in the projections shocks. 
2. Uruguay Round (UR) Commitments. 
Given the benchmark year for the data is 2001, developed countries (DCs) have completed their 
UR commitments. Thus, in the baseline we merely enforce the ceiling limits on output and export 
subsidy expenditure for the developed countries. In the latter case, we have additional WTO subsidy 
expenditure notifications data to calculate actual subsidy limits in 2001 as a percentage of allowable UR 
subsidy expenditure limits.24 The ceiling limits are imposed employing complementary slack conditions 
in GEMPACK (Bach and Pearson, 1996). For the developing countries, a linear time path is assumed 
where in 2001 it is assumed that 7/10ths of the UR commitments (1994 – 2004) have been met. Thus, 
remaining UR commitments are based on the remaining 3/10ths of the required total tariff reduction. 
Bilateral tariff rate reductions are implemented as percentage reductions in the exogenous 
tariff variable in the GTAP model. As in the previous section, for the developed countries it is assumed 
that all the tariff rate commitments of the UR have been met in 2001. For the developing countries we 
again assume that a linear time proportion (7/10ths) of the commitments have been met, with a remaining 
3/10ths proportion reduction imposed. In the case of the Rest of the World (ROW) composite region, a 
component part consists of developing country members. Thus, a GDP share weighted reduction in the 
ROW’s tariffs is incorporated to account for the remaining developing country UR commitments. Tariff 
rate quotas are included in those sectors where  
On a number of bilateral routes in the model, we have included tariff rate quotas (TRQs), that 
is we have simulated an import quota with in-quota and over-quota tariff rates. In the model, TRQ’s are 
represented by a conditional complementary slack statement pioneered by Elbehri and Pearson (2005) 
which is a function of the ‘fill rate’ of the import quota (i.e., in-quota, on-quota, or over-quota) and the 
tariff rate (in-quota tariff, over-quota tariff, on quota tariff).  
To identify TRQ bilateral routes, we employ the Agricultural Market Access Database (AMAD), 
which provides necessary estimates of in-quota tariff rates, over-quota to in-quota tariff ratios and quota 
fill rates. However, in some cases the broad sectoral aggregation excludes the possibility of including 
TRQ’s on narrow product definitions which will only account for a minority proportion of trade along the 
route. A similar argument also applies to the composite ROW region which includes a considerable 
number of regions which do not employ TRQs and for simplicity is excluded from the TRQ treatment. 
Furthermore, given the completion of the EBA deal, EU TRQs on ACP countries are also excluded. 
3. Enlargement Shocks – Border Protection 
All tariff rates and export subsidy expenditures are eliminated on trade between the EU15 and the 
accession members and on intra EU10 trade. Further tariff shocks are introduced on accession member 
non-EU imports in 2001 to mimic the EU15 average common external tariff (CET) in 2020.  
4. Agenda 2000 (A2000) commitments and the Mid Term Review (MTR) 
To characterise sugar and milk quotas we employ complementary slack equations (Bach and Pearson, 
1996) to allow binding/non-binding status of the quota. Changes in the milk quota allocations under the 
                                               
24 In this model, we ignore the agreed quantity constraints on exports under the UR round. Rather, we 
focus on export expenditure since between the two constraints, this is usually the more binding (Frandsen 
and Jensen, 2001). 
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MTR are imposed as shocks to the exogenous production limit variable, whilst production may be less 
than or equal to this level of production. For the ‘new’ accession members milk quota rights in 2001 
(ASEU, 2001) are compared with granted quota rights on accession (Jensen and Frandsen, 2003) to 
calculate quota allocation reductions. Sugar quotas remain untouched. Equally, we follow Lips and 
Rieder (2002) by assuming that the quota rent accruing to EU15 members is already capitalised within the 
value of sugar/milk production in the GTAP model. Employing estimates of milk and sugar quota rents 
by EU15 region from Francois et al., (2005) and Frandsen et al., (2003) respectively, we strip out the 
quota rent from the payments to the factors of production in the 2001 benchmark database such that zero 
profit production decisions in the model are based on shadow prices (i.e., net of quota rent values) in 
accordance with the microeconomic analytics of quota behaviour. The remaining quota rent is now 
inserted as a separate income identity in the regional household income function. Since the benchmark 
period is a pre-accession time point for the EU10, we assume quota rents are zero in 2001. Imposition of 
the quota through complementary slack conditions allows the model to calculate endogenously the level 
of quota rent in the ‘new’ member states.  
 To characterise the set aside of land we employ a productivity variable (afeall), where a 
percentage reduction in afeall in the arable land using sectors by 10% implies that for every hectare used, 
only 0.9ha is productive. We assume that for the EU15, the GTAP benchmark data implicitly includes set 
aside reflected by the levels of production and demand for land in 2001 (benchmark year). Thus, no 
change to EU15 set-aside is implemented, although employing set-aside rates calculated for 2001 (ASEU, 
2001) we employ reverse shocks in the EU15 to remove set-aside of land under the CAP abolition 
scenario. In the EU10, the Commission’s “prospects for agricultural markets” document (2004-2011) 
suggests that due to the small farm exemption, set-aside will be some way below the mandatory 10%. 
Thus an arbitrary 5% set-aside is imposed. To eliminate the possibility of land reallocation from arable to 
non arable sectors (as in the standard GTAP specification) in response to productivity reductions in arable 
land, we explicitly separate the land endowment into arable and non arable components (i.e., create two 
land factors). In this way, the elasticity of substitution between arable and non-arable using sectors is 
zero. This also reflects the notion that very little arable land is used for pasture purposes. The total arable 
(and pasture) land endowment is held fixed to reflect a fixed base arable land area. The quasi-decoupled 
nature of area and set-aside payments in 2001 is characterised as an input subsidy to the land factor in the 
GTAP model data. 
Comparative static CGE models are generally based on medium to long run model assumptions 
(i.e., full employment, perfect mobility of factors, long run investment behaviour). As a result, we choose 
not to incorporate intervention buying which is a short run market management mechanism, thereby 
having limited effects on long run price and output trends. Following Frandsen et al., (2003), 
intervention price falls are introduced in the ‘wheat’, ‘other grains’, ‘meat processing’, ‘dairy’ and 
‘sugar processing’ sectors as percentage reductions in export subsidy border support. In the former three 
sectors, intervention price reduction shocks account for the fact that the reductions began before 2001. In 
accordance with the Mid Term Review agreement, we reduce the dairy sector intervention price 25% 
(introduced from 2005 in three equal stages). Finally, the proposed reforms for the sugar sector suggest a 
39% reduction in the intervention price for white sugar and a 42.6% reduction in the intervention price for 
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beet sugar. The GTAP data does not separate beet from cane production. Thus, we assume an aggregated 
40% reduction in the sugar sector intervention price.  
The benchmark year (2001) of the GTAP data falls within the reference period (2000-2002). 
Thus, as a starting point it is assumed that the EU15 direct payment totals25 received in the GTAP 2001 
database are indicative of the single farm payment (SFP) reference payment total for each EU15 region. 
This total is adjusted to account for the fact that the SFP only applies to 10% of the set aside area. Thus, if 
a farm (region) has 14% of the land area set aside in the reference period, that region will only receive 
10/14th’s of the payment from set aside, and 90/86th’s of the payment from the area premium. Further 
adjustments to the SFP totals are also made to incorporate additional milk and sugar sector premium 
payments to compensate for approved and planned (respectively) and intervention price reductions. 
Estimates of regional milk premium totals are based on projections of output per cow per region 
multiplied by dairy herd projections for each region multiplied by premium per unit. For the sugar sector, 
the EU has set aside 1.5 billion euro to compensate all 25 member countries for the 40 per cent price cuts. 
Thus, each EU region’s projected allocation is based on regional sugar beet area shares. Once each EU 
region’s SFP is calculated, 5% of the total is removed as part of the modulation scheme to divert funds to 
rural development needs.26 Finally, in accordance with the CAP reforms for Mediterranean products, 
all tobacco direct aids are to be included in the single farm payment, whilst the minimum 60% of olive oil 
direct aids will also be included into the single farm payment. In addition, the Spanish government 
negotiated additional compensation of €20million from the Mediterranean products reform package. 
It is assumed that by 2020, all EU regions will have adopted the ‘maximum decoupling 
scenario’. Thus, to characterise the single farm payment, all direct payments are removed from each of 
the regions and the net introduced as a uniform input subsidy (i.e., hectare premium) payment on the land 
factor (Jensen and Frandsen, 2003). In this way, all agricultural activities receive the same reward, 
thereby making the payment production neutral. To implement SFPs and modulation contributions for 
ALL 25 EU members we follow a three-stage process. Firstly, calculated net totals (after removal of 
modulation contributions) for the EU15 members are allocated such that land premiums are equal across 
all using sectors whilst respecting precalculated payment totals. Subsequently, an average EU15 land 
premiums are calculated and uniformly imposed in the EU10 regions. This provides an estimate of the 
accession members SFP totals as calculated by the model. Finally, accession member SFP totals are 
reduced 5% for modulation and then re-implemented ensuring that hectare premium values are equal 
across all agricultural sectors. In the CAP abolition scenarios, all domestic subsidy wedges (i.e., output 
subsidies, capital, land and intermediate input subsidies) in the GTAP database are removed. 
The allocation of total modulation contributions from across the EU25 follows the 
Commission’s proposals. Thus, regional allocation shares are based on the agricultural area shares (65% 
weighting) and agricultural employment shares (35% weighting). This weighted estimate is subsequently 
corrected employing a relative GDP per capita weighting. A further constraint is imposed within the 
model to ensure that all regions receive at least 80% (as specified by the European Commission) of their 
initial modulation contributions.  
                                               
25 That is, land subsidies and capital subsidies in each region. 
26 Modulation begins at a rate of 3% of direct aid payments in 2005, climbing to a ceiling limit of 5% 
from 2007 onwards. 
  24
 In the 2001 benchmark, the CAP budget only applies to the EU15 regions. Thus, each EU15 
regions makes contributions to Brussels in the form of 90% of agricultural tariffs and modulation funds 
and gains receipts on output subsidies (Amber Box), direct payments (land and capital subsidies) and 
intermediate input subsidies (i.e., payment aids on seeds, forage, silage, disease and pest management 
etc.). The difference between total receipts and total contributions by each member gives the net resource 
cost of the CAP which is met by uniform percentage GDP contributions by each member state such that 
the total CAP budget balances at zero. This implies that at the member state level, a region may be a net 
loser (e.g., UK, Germany) or a net gainer (e.g., France, Spain) from the budget. In the case of Spain (UK), 
this would imply that regional incomes exceed (are less than) regional expenditures. Thus, to restore 
general equilibrium, regional savings are increased (reduced) to restore parity. At the EU level, savings 
remain unchanged. Over the time frame of the experiment, the EU and consequently the CAP budget 
expands from 15 to 25 members. Thus, dummy variables are employed to introduce the accession 
members into the budget mechanisms. The analysis also includes the UK rebate mechanism, where 66% 
of the UK’s net contribution is refunded, whilst the remaining EU14 (EU24) fund the bill based on GDP 
shares. In the case of Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden, their share of the refund bill is 
reduced to only one quarter of their GDP share. In each of the simulations, it is assumed that the rebate 
mechanism is eliminated by 2020. 
5. Chinese Accession 
To characterise Chinese Accession, we exogenously reduce unilateral tariff rates to meet target projected 
post accession tariff estimates from Ianchovichina and Walmsley (2003)  
6. Everything But Arms 
In the Everything But Arms (EBA) deal, we capture long run tariff eliminations by the EU25 on imports 
from Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Uganda and composite regions Other South Africa and 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa. Since these regions appear in the ROW composite, then a trade weighted 
tariff reduction by the EU25 regions is imposed on ROW imports. 
 

